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Abstract:  This article presents a picture of each of the three theoretical models—autonomy, socialist, and 
deontological—and indicates how they differ from one another in their application to some aspects of attorney-
client confidentiality, one of the most hotly debated topics of professional ethics.  
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[pg761]“Any occupation or profession is unworthy if it requires of us that we do as a 
functionary what we would be ashamed to do as a private person."—Sydney J. Harris  
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 After extensive debate, the American Bar Association adopted the new Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (hereinafter Model Rules) at its annual meeting in August 1983 [FN1] As 
scholars, attorneys, and the public peruse the new ethical guidelines for lawyers, they will  
probably conceptualize the Model Rules in terms of the two antagonistic  philosophical 
positions that heretofore have characterized  scholarly analysis of legal ethics. Those 
philosophical positions are dichotomous: there is an "autonomy" model and an opposing 
"socialist" model of professional responsibility. Writers such as Professors Monroe H. 
Freedman and Charles Fried seem to have in mind a theoretical model that places prime 
importance on the [pg763] "autonomy" of the client and views any deviation therefrom as a 
move toward a socialist conception of the role of the lawyer.FN2 The autonomy model has not 
been spelled out in detail, and the supposedly contrasting socialist model even less so. But even 
in their relatively amorphous state in the current discussion of legal ethics, these two models 
provide a rough utilitarian theory for those who would fashion standards of conduct for 
attorneys. What is missing is a nonutilitarian, or deontological, model which may help explain 
some of the anomalies in current positions and serve as a heuristic guide for further scholarly 
inquiry. It is the purpose of this article to present a picture of each of the three theoretical 
models—autonomy, socialist, and deontological—and to indicate how they differ from one 
another in their application to some aspects of attorney-client confidentiality, one of the most 
hotly debated topics of professional ethics.  
 
 We argue that the three models represent vertices on an equilateral triangle: each is 
equal to the other two. Thus, a move away from the autonomy model is not necessarily a move 
in the direction of the socialist model; it might equally be a move in the direction of the 
deontological model. In the second section of this article we shall present a triptych of the three 
models from a theoretical standpoint; in the third section we shall try to show how they differ 
from one another in their application to aspects of the debate over attorney-client 
confidentiality. These differences make each model a criticism of the other two, and suggest a 
more rigorous way of conceptualizing problems of professional responsibility than many of the 
intuitivist writings in this field.  
 
 The autonomy model espoused by Fried and Freedman is the mainstream position of the 
practicing bar. We will attempt to show that it is not ultimately an ethical model at all, but a 
se1f-serving professional attitude that in some areas parallels ethical standards. Our own 
preferred theoretical position is that of the deontological model. [pg764] We do not regard 
ourselves as anticapitalistic or antientrepreneurial, but rather we decline to accept the 
dichotomy implicit in the writings of others that whatever is not entrepreneurial is socialist.FN3 
Instead, we contend that a dimension exists for a responsible view of the adversary system in a 




II. THREE MODELS OF LEGAL ETHICS 
 
A. The Autonomy Model  
 
 1. Description  
 
 The Fried-Freedman view of legal ethics is that of the lawyer as a facilitator of his 
client's autonomy within the legal system. Personal autonomy, they believe, is the key to human 
dignity. Thus, the attorney, as a professional, serves a vital role in helping legally 
unknowledgeable persons attain their human dignity. Those writers give three reasons why 
lawyers should play that precise role.  
 
 The first is a moral reason. As Fried writes, "it is not only legally but also morally right 
that a lawyer adopt as his dominant purpose the furthering of his client's interests—. . . it is 
right that a professional put the interests of his client above some idea, however valid, of the 
collective interest."FN4 In this view, the lawyer becomes a "friend" to the client, making "his 
client's interests his own insofar as this is necessary to preserve and foster the client's autonomy 
within the law.”FN5 For "to assist others in understanding and realizing their legal rights is 
always morally worthy."FN6 Because the lawyer's role is grounded now in a moral conception 
of friendship, Fried concludes that "the individual lawyer does a morally worthy thing 
whomever he serves.”FN7 
  
 Secondly, it is suggested that the autonomy model facilitates and preserves the 
adversary system of justice. In Freedman's view, a clash of adversaries is necessary if truth is to 
emerge.FN8 A lawyer, being wholly partisan on her client's behalf, nevertheless contributes to 
ultimate truth because she must face an equally partisan attorney on the other side. Of course, 
this picture obtains, if at all, in the litigation and appeal process. But the bulk of legal business 
involves advising and helping clients outside the confines of a case filed in court. Yet Freedman 
extends the picture by simple sleight of hand: a lawyer is [pg765] her client's "champion" 
because the client must face the enormous legal resources of society and the awesome police 
and military power of the state.FN9 In other words, even if the "other side" is not represented 
by a definable partisan attorney, nevertheless the adversary paradigm is appropriate because the 
"other side" is always society, with its overwhelming resources and power. The client's attorney 
is presumably the client's equalizer in this otherwise unfair battle; with the equalizer in tow, the 
client's fight against society may also allow truth to emerge.FN10 Or, perhaps, once we get to 
the c1ient-vs.-society level, it is not so important that truth emerge. Thus, in Fried's somewhat 
amended view of the adversarial clash, a lawyer, as a matter of ethics, should actively promote 
the "interests" or "needs" of her client at the expense of third parties or the public at large.FN11 
 
 Thirdly, and somewhat inconsistently, the Fried-Freedman view urges us to adopt the 
autonomy model because in the long run it best serves the interests of society.FN12 Perhaps the 
notion is that of the "invisible hand" theory, popularized by Adam Smith, that individual 
entrepreneurs acting selfishly will nevertheless in the aggregate promote maximum economic 
wellbeing for all through a competitive market.FN13 Thus, by "championing" a client's 
interests "against" society, a lawyer, perhaps unwittingly, is serving the true interests of society 




 2. Critique  
 
 Professor Fried's notion of the attorney as "friend" has been the subject of a sharp 
critique by Professors Dauer and Leff.FN14 There is certainly something strange about an 
instant friend whose friendship is purchased by paying a retainer. Yet, apart from its 
strangeness, the idea of a lawyer as "friend" imparts to the autonomy model a certain feeling of 
moral warmth; one might picture Sacco and Vanzetti, persecuted and friendless immigrants 
whose only real "friend" was young attorney Felix Frankfurter. More practically, if a potential 
[pg766] client feels that he can obtain a friend by retaining an attorney, he will be more inclined 
to do so. Certainly the idea of lawyer as friend aids the attorney in maximizing her own income.  
 
 We will not recapitulate here the critique of Dauer and Leff, nor the rejoinder by 
Freedman.FN15  Rather, let us assume that the lawyer is, in some sense, a "friend" of the client. 
We only ask: Is there a moral value in "friendship"?  
 
 A "friend" is not only someone who will help you out or lend you a hand, but is also 
someone who will defend you even if you are not wholly in the right. A friend is a partisan who 
does not subject you to moral criticism. The notion is quite universal. A "family" is often 
regarded as a small group of friends in that one family member will come to the aid of another 
against third parties or society as a whole, regardless of the morality of the situation. A "nation" 
is also conceptualized in the same sense: "my country right or wrong." The relationships of 
family, friend, or nation thus transcend moral considerations that individuals might have. This 
accounts for the attractiveness of such relationships, but also exposes their amorality.  
 
 There was nothing "moral" in the blind patriotism of numerous German citizens who 
followed Hitler. There is nothing "moral" in  the friendship of the Cosa Nostra or Sicilian 
Mafia.FN16 The long list of  lawyers involved in the "dirty tricks" of Watergate may have been  
"friends" of President Nixon, but there was nothing moral in their activities.FN17 Of course, we 
"understand" people who act out of  family loyalty, friendship, or patriotism. In criminal cases 
we do not require a spouse to testify against the accused, because we realize that the bonds of 
matrimony may override any concern for truth.  But although we understand these motives, 
occasionally forgive them, or even label them "virtues," it is incoherent to equate friendship 
with morality. Rather, when morality is at stake, a friend is just a coconspirator.  
 
 But we do not have to conjure up extreme cases, such as Nazi Germany or the Mafia, to 
see why the idea of "friendship," if applied to the lawyer-client relationship, would conflict with 
the dictates of morality. Suppose a client, accused of a bank robbery, asks [pg767] his attorney 
to safeguard the guns the client used in the robbery, and the lawyer, as "friend," takes the 
weapons and hides them in a safe deposit box. That would be an act of friendship, but the In re 
Ryder court disciplined and suspended an attorney for that very act."FN18 Or suppose an 
attorney, visiting her client who is in a small county jail awaiting trial, notices that the outside 
door is unlocked and the guard is asleep. Should she not, as a "friend," notify the client of these 
facts so that the client may escape? Or suppose a client asks his "friendly" attorney to sign a tax 
return that contains materially false statements. If the attorney were a "friend" in any ordinary 
sense of that word—and it is the ordinary sense of the word that Fried apparently relics upon 
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and employs—she would do these things, and more, for her client. Surely, therefore, the notion 
of "friendship" does not add any moral component to the autonomy model.FN19 
 
 Nor is the autonomy model made any more praiseworthy by associating it with the ideal 
of the adversary system. To be sure, the adversary system requires vigorous and zealous 
advocacy of all cases by both sides in order to illuminate the legal issues for the judge or 
decision maker and to help ensure that the truth will emerge. In this sense, a lawyer who does a 
halfhearted and lazy job for his client is acting immorally. He is thwarting the emergence of 
truth, as well as violating his implicit promise to his client to defend the client's cause 
zealously-a promise held out by the very image of an attorney in an adversary system. But we 
still must define "zealous." Zealous advocacy should not mean slipping a drug into the 
opposing counsel's cup of coffee to make that counsel drowsy during the trial. It should not 
include stealing key books from the opposing counsel's library. It should not mean attempting 
to bribe the judge. It should not mean suborning perjury, or concealing evidence, or threatening 
jurors. These are instances of "not playing the game fairly," but then the question is: "What is 
the game?" The "game" is an artificial contest for determining the truth within the limits of fair 
debate, and those limits are both defined and implied.FN20 The idea of slipping a drug into the 
opponent's coffee cup may never have been mentioned, or even considered, before our 
articulation of it here. Nevertheless, any attorney would instinctively know that this specific act 
is strictly forbidden by the spirit of the implied rules of the adversary system.  
 
 But in addition to these boundary rules, whether express (e.g., it is a crime to attempt to 
bribe a judge or suborn perjury), or implied (e.g., it is forbidden to slip a drug into the opposing 
counsel's cup of [pg768] coffee), there are many other rules that define the adversary system 
and make it highly artificial. Most prominent are the rules of evidence. A zealous attorney 
might have a strong desire to present hearsay evidence that will favor her client's cause, but the 
rules of the system disallow it because experience shows that hearsay evidence is more likely to 
thwart than to further the quest for truth. Or consider the rules of discovery: suppose it is in a 
client's interest to shred documents that the other side seeks to discover. A zealous attorney 
might be tempted to advise the shredding of the documents, which would certainly help her 
"champion" her client against a hostile world (as well as befriend her client). But the rules 
limiting the adversary system provide otherwise.  
 
 To be sure, a proponent of the autonomy model might reply that an attorney's task is to 
do everything she can for her client within the rules of the adversary system. But this neat 
formulation does not really finesse the problem. The rules must be interpreted, and if one takes 
a strict constructionist view, one might very well do things to "harass" the opposing counsel in 
ways similar to, though perhaps not so overtly wrong as, the drugged coffee example. Various  
"harassment" techniques might include calling the opposing counsel on the telephone in the 
middle of the night, letting the air out of his automobile tire, or sending him a phony client to 
waste his time. Or, one might take an unwarrantably restrictive view of the other side's  
discovery requests—which apparently has already become "good adversary practice" among 
practitioners, showing how the word "good" can be perverted. FN21 An attorney may also, as 
many trial attorneys these days in fact do, try to slip in hearsay evidence for its prejudicial 
impact upon the jury—again, in disregard of the spirit behind restrictive rules of evidence. All 
of these attorneys want to "win" for their clients, and the goal of winning seems to require 
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sidestepping the restrictive rules. But this kind of winning is incompatible with the goal of the 
adversary system: discovery of the truth.  Hence we may conclude that there is no necessary 
connection between the adversary system and the autonomy model, between "winning" and 
"discovering the truth." (There is of course an overlap: trying to win for the client roughly 
coincides with being a zealous advocate within the rules, but the autonomy model cannot claim 
a necessary connection with the adversary system.)  
 
 Finally, let us consider that the autonomy model serves societal interests by positing the 
primacy of the client against society. It is [pg769] hard to criticize the "invisible hand" theory 
of Adam Smith, since in the process society is redefined; society's ultimate interest, then, is not 
ascertainable apart from the "society" that is the result of the "invisible hand" process. 
Nevertheless, Smith's economic model has parallels to our present topic. When it appeared in 
the nineteenth century that unbridled capitalism would lead to increasingly big business 
combinations and "trusts," the Sherman Act and later the Clayton Act were passed to check the 
tendency of business to consolidate and combine.FN22  Smith's paradigm thus required 
reformulation: single-minded pursuit of profit by each entrepreneur was permitted while 
competitive forces were kept in place; but when entrepreneurs sought to increase their profits 
by combinations that would diminish competition, the government had to intervene with new 
rules. The logic of Smith's original position would have led to oligopolistic control of all 
American business by a handful of giant corporations and trusts; hence restraining rules had to 
be introduced. Similarly, trying to "win" for the client, if pressed too far, can subvert the 
adversary nature of the system and led to injustice. Since it is the goal of society to seek justice, 
one cannot conclude that there is a necessary connection between society's goal and going all 
out for an individual client. "Winning" for the client, like maximizing profit for the  
entrepreneur, serves perhaps as a stimulant for  zeal and effort, but should not be elevated to  
the primary goal. The client himself may want to win whatever the cost to society, but if the  
advocate adopts that goal as her own, then it is not clear that society will be the ultimate 
beneficiary. Restraints upon the zealousness of advocacy, like restraints upon "unfair" 
competition in business, may be necessary to save the system.  
 
 The autonomy model, whatever it does for the client, seems to be in the best economic 
self-interest of lawyers. The fullest expression of the autonomy model is found in The American 
Lawyer's Code of Conduct (hereinafter Lawyer's Code),FN23 primarily written by Freedman; it 
reflects the wishes of practical, practicing attorneys. FN24 As we shall see later in this 
article,FN25 the autonomy model places an extremely high value on total confidentiality in the 
attorney-client relationship. Clearly, if the clients believe that whatever they tell their attorneys 
will be kept in strict confidence, clients will be more encouraged  to utilize the services of 
attorneys.FN26 No practicing [pg770] attorney would want to scare away a client by informing 
the client that if he tells her certain things she will "blow the whistle" on him—if the  practicing 
attorney wants to maximize her own income. Moreover, Fried's notion of "friendship" adds to 
the client's feeling of security. If the lawyer is truly his "friend" as well as his "champion" 
against everyone else, the client will more likely seek legal services and more willingly pay for 
them. Crudely put, the more an attorney is a "hired gun," the more likely she will be hired.  
 




 1. Description  
 
 If the autonomy model elevates the client's interests above those of the state, the 
socialist model does the reverse. Law in a socialist state is an expediency designed to carry out 
state objectives, and even legal theory is evaluated from the standpoint of its utility in serving 
state and public interests.FN27 As applied to the citizen, the law is a method of discipline, 
guidance, and education; the citizen is instructed to conform his conduct to desirable social 
objectives. The ultimate purpose is to refashion and remake man according to the vision of the 
state. FN28 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the role of an attorney in a socialist system is 
that of an agent for the collectivity.FN29 Her role as agent for the state transcends her duty to 
her client. However, the attorney would probably perceive no conflict of duties, since the client 
should by definition harmonize his conduct with that prescribed by the state. Hence, the 
attorney is acting in the best interests of both the state and the client if she undertakes to 
reeducate the client who has deviated from the path prescribed by law.  
 
 Thus, a person who may have broken the law may expect that his attorney will notify 
the state authorities of the transgression. The attorney cannot be expected to keep the matter 
confidential, since in so doing she would be conspiring with the client's deviationism. Even if 
the client does not reveal everything to his attorney, the attorney may be expected to assist the 
prosecutor in finding the objective truth; indeed, as Freedman puts it, in a socialist system 
"there is no division of duty between the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel.”FN30 The 
socialist attorney is a "friend" of her client in that she will encourage the client to confess 
everything and then be rehabilitated, [pg.771] since rehabilitation, the only cure for 
deviationism, is in the best interest of the client as defined by the state.  
 
 2. Critique  
 
 The socialist model is obviously opposed to the autonomy model, but it is also in 
opposition to that model we will call the "deontological" model. Just as the socialist model 
elevates the interests of the state above those of the client, it elevates the state above the dictates 
of morality. There can be no moral norms other than those imposed by the collectivity. Thus, if 
the stale decides to persecute a minority group or political dissidents, no countervailing 
morality in favor of these groups will be entertained by the state. The Aryan philosophy of Nazi 
Germany held that certain minority groups should be eliminated to purify the Aryan stock; this 
was an imposition of a collective judgment against individual moral rights. Of course one is 
free to decide that collective morality is correct; indeed, Rousseau attempted a justification of 
the "general will" along these lines.FN31 But the extent that one is unpersuaded that moral 
standards are ultimately defined by a collectivity, the socialist model is at variance with any 
model of legal ethics that builds upon individual moral standards.  
 
 But apart from any judgment one might want to make about the desirability of the 
socialist model, for present purposes it suffices to point out that eliminating confidentiality will 
greatly reduce the role of the attorney in the system. As Freedman and others have often 
observed, accused persons will not tend to seek the services of attorneys if the latter are, like the 
prosecutors, agents of the state. That does not mean that there will be no role for attorneys; an 
attorney, after all, may usefully present her client's cases to the tribunal in a sympathetic 
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fashion. But a client is not assured in advance of his attorney's sympathy; indeed, if the attorney 
is convinced that the client is a willful deviationist, the attorney will not want to endanger her 
own standing with the tribunal by appearing to be sympathetic to such an enemy of the state. In 
any event, it is clear that the role of an attorney is substantially reduced in a socialist system. 
China, the most populous nation in the world today, seems to have very few attorneys and no 
guaranteed right to counsel.FN32 Perhaps from the standpoint of the collectivity, this is no 
serious loss. But we argue that there is a moral value in providing access to the law—in any 
system—to those who have not studied the law and who cannot [pg.772] be expected to know 
its content or to predict the behavior of state officials on the basis of that content. Without 
attorneys to explain what the law is and to translate it, people will act at their peril and will be 
subjected to unchecked official tyranny.FN33 We argue that freedom from this subjection to 
arbitrary official tyranny is a moral value, a value that is diminished by the socialist model of 
legal ethics.  
 
C. The Deontological Model  
 
 1. Description  
 
 "Deontology" is, unfortunately, a cumbersome word; it is derived from Greek words 
meaning "science of duty." However, it best expresses a view of ethics that is opposed to 
utilitarianism. A deontological theory of ethics says that some acts are morally obligatory 
regardless of their consequences for human happiness.FN34 For example, a bank would have 
no moral right to take the assets of its richest depositor and distribute them to all the other 
depositors; even though the latter group might be happy at the expense of "only" one person, 
the act itself is wrong. A prosecutor would similarly disobey the moral law if he were to secure 
the conviction of an alleged mass murderer he knows is innocent in order to calm the public 
that is agitated because of fear that the mass murderer might still be at large. It would also be 
wrong for a student to cheat on an exam even though the student needs the educational degree 
to pursue a lifetime of selfless dedication to the poor and downtrodden of the world. The 
leading philosopher of deontological ethics, Immanuel Kant, argued that a moral duty could not 
be transgressed even if obeying it would lead to harm to others. His famous example was that a 
person could not tell a lie to a would-be murderer even to save the life of an intended 
victim.FN35 But Kant's position is too rigid. It would appear from his example that a person 
has a moral duty to an innocent third party not to facilitate one who would harm that party, and 
indeed to intercede to stop the harm. Hence, a conflict arises between the moral duty not to tell 
a lie and the moral duty to prevent harm to an innocent third party.  
 
 W. D. Ross has accordingly argued that moral conflicts can arise [pg773] in 
deontological theory, and that it is incoherent to insist upon universal validity of anyone moral 
rule to the exclusion of all others.FN36  We will follow Ross' approach in this article, taking the 
deonotological model to mean that moral rules cannot be eclipsed by nonmoral considerations 
(e.g., the client's "interests" or "autonomy," or the "interests of the state"), but that they may 
conflict with other moral rules. When they do conflict, we shall try to analyze that conflict and 





 The specific deontological rules of ethics that shall concern us in this article will 
become evident as we discuss the models in the third section. For the moment, summarily 
stated, we shall argue that the following, among others, constitute relevant deontological rules: 
(1) If A intends to harm B and the harm is serious either physically or financially, and if C 
discovers A's intention, then C is charged with the ethical duty to act to prevent the harm to B, 
such as by warning B; (2) any person is under a moral obligation not to commit fraud or 
perjury, perjury being defined as a material falsehood; (3) if C elicits information from A "in 
confidence," then unless there is a conflict with another moral obligation. C has a duty to keep 
the information confidential; (4) there is a moral value in some people becoming professional 
attorneys, so as to give others access to the content of the law and access to informed 
predictions about the probable behavior of officials. In the third section of this article, we will 
examine conflicts between rules (1) and (2) on the one hand, and rules (3) and (4) on the other.  
 
 2. Critique  
 
 The deontological model is best criticized by comparison with the other two models. 
There are costs associated with using the deontological model, not the least of which is that it 
requires some inroads, as we shall see, into attorney-client confidentiality. To the extent of 
these inroads, the legal profession might suffer a diminution of business, for clearly the value of 
attorneys to clients varies directly with the degree of confidentiality on which the client may 
rely. On the other hand, there may be benefits from adopting the deontological model, benefits 
which may be inferred from the previously discussed criticisms of the other two models. Since 
the deontological model is our preferred model for legal ethics, we may be too close to it to 
appraise it critically. We think that the criticisms will be apparent enough, however, if either of 
the other two models are contrasted with it.  
 
[pg774] III. APPLYING THE THREE MODELS 
 
A. The Problem of Confidentiality: General Considerations  
 
 In subsection B of this section we will discuss several examples of attorney-client 
confidentiality with respect to the specific application of the autonomy, socialist, and 
deontological models. Before doing so, it is appropriate here to consider in a more general way 
what is involved in confidentiality and how it is viewed by the differing philosophies of the 
three models.  
 
 Let us start with a simple ethical precept: A has a moral obligation not to cause serious 
physical harm to B. We exclude those cases in which A may be "justified" in doing so: A and B 
are soldiers in opposite warring armies, A is the public executioner and B has committed a 
capital offense, or B has attacked A and A, in self-defense, has no choice but to seriously injure 
B. Instead, we will assume that A simply has a grudge against B (e.g., from prior financial 
dealings), or A dislikes B for some other reason, or perhaps B has rejected A's amatory 
advances.FN37  
 
 Now, to introduce the problem of confidentiality, let us assume that C learns of A's 
intent to cause serious physical harm to B. C has a moral obligation to do something to prevent 
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A from harming B. C may call the police (assuming that will be effective),FN38 try to talk A  
out of it, threaten A that C will disclose the intention to B unless A effectively calls it off, or 
warn B directly. Even though B is a stranger to C, C has a moral duty to B to try to prevent the 
harm.  
 
 Does anything change depending upon how C learned of A's intent to harm B? Suppose 
C is in a restaurant and happens to overhear A mentioning her intention to her friends at another 
table. In this case, C of course has no obligation to anyone, including A, that might conflict 
with his obligation to warn B of the impending harm. This is the easy case, but now let us 
consider the hard one. A and C are friends, and A asks C: "If I tell you something, will you 
keep it confidential?" C agrees and A then reveals her intent to harm B. Cs obligation to B is, 
prima facie, the same as it was in the "easy" case, but now he is faced with the question of 
whether he has an overriding obligation of confidentiality to A. Can C rationalize to himself 
that he would never have learned of A's intent to harm B but for his promise to keep what A 
was about to tell him confidential, and thus having learned of A's intent, C must now proceed 
"as if" he had never heard A tell him the plan to harm B? A promise is, after all, something that 
the promisor becomes morally obliged to [pg775] fulfill.[FN39]  The "consideration" (if one 
were needed) for Cs promise was A's revelation to C of A's otherwise secret intent. A relied on 
Cs promise not to reveal her intent. Thus, C may reason, C is under a moral obligation not to 
reveal A's confidence. C is "shielded" by the promise to A. Hence, C must stand by and do 
nothing while A proceeds to effectuate her plan to harm B. Is C’s moral conclusion accurate?  
 
 Cs promise to keep confidential what A will tell him might be analyzed against a 
common background of morality that gives effect not only to promises but also to implied 
understandings regarding the immorality of causing serious harm to other people. C might say 
to A: "It is true that I agreed to hold what you were about to tell me in confidence, but I did not 
expect that you would tell me something that, in good conscience, considering my moral 
obligation to others, I am morally bound to reveal." Or C might say: "You had no right to bind 
me to a confidence when you knew that you were going to tell me something that I would be 
morally bound to reveal." Or C could put it this way: "Now that you have told me your 
intention, I see that you have tricked me into promising to remain silent. But if I remain silent, 
then I will be as morally guilty as you. If I do nothing and you harm B, it will be the same as if 
I had harmed B myself. Surely you did not expect me to share in an immoral act, or if you did, 
it would be inconsistent of you to enforce against me the morality of keeping promises to 
enable you to proceed with an immoral act against B." On this reasoning C could conclude that 
if A cannot be dissuaded, C may proceed to warn B, despite Cs promise of confidentiality to A.  
 
 These preliminary considerations were necessary to set the stage for a discussion of 
attorney-client confidentiality. Assuming the same hypothetical situation as above, we now 
assume further that C is an attorney. What do the three model philosophies of legal ethics say 
that C should do?  
 
 The autonomy model places an extremely high value upon confidentiality. Either C is 
A's very close "friend" and hence would not reveal A's intent to B, or indeed C is an extension 
of A's personality, and since A would not warn B, neither should C. This philosophy finds 
expression in Alternative B of Rule 1.2 of the Lawyer's Code, which requires an attorney both 
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to keep a confidence and not to "use it in any way detrimental to the interests of the client, as 
the client perceives them, or as the lawyer reasonably understands the client to perceive them . . 
. .”FN40 
 
 In contrast, the socialist model places an extremely low value [pg.776] upon 
confidentiality.  C may be A's attorney, but C is an agent of the state first and foremost. A's 
intent to cause serious physical harm to B is contrary to law, and hence C must reveal the 
confidence in order to protect society against a breach of one of its laws. It is not so much the 
harm to B which must be prevented, but rather the harm to the state, which in this case is 
represented by laws protecting B against this kind of assault.  
 
 In contrast to both of the foregoing models, the deontological model is reflected in the 
Model Rules, which would allow C to disclose the confidence if that is the only way to prevent 
harm to B.FN41 Indeed, despite the impression that a deontological model of legal ethics would 
mandate the disclosure in order to prevent harm to B,FN42 we argue that the deontological 
model of legal ethics should only allow, but not require, the attorney to reveal the confidence. 
By "allowing" the attorney to reveal the confidence, a deontological model of legal ethics 
would simply destroy any barrier that attorney-client confidentiality would pose against the 
disclosure. In other words, there would then exist no professional reason why a lawyer is under 
any disability to disclose a confidence. The attorney would thus be "taken out" of the attorney-
client relationship for this purpose, and placed back in the role of any person (C), who would 
then have a moral obligation to make the disclosure if our previous analysis is correct.FN43 
 
 An important variant on the attorney-client confidentiality problem is advance 
disclosure to the client of the exception to confidentiality. Would disclosure make the situation 
different? Let us consider our earlier example in which A asked her friend C if C would keep a 
confidence. Suppose C were to reply: "I will, unless the secret you tell me places me in a 
morally untenable position, such as requiring me not to take action when an innocent person 
might suffer harm." Such a reply would fully disclose the parameters of Cs view of 
confidentiality, and if A were to proceed anyway to tell C her plans to harm B, A should not be 
surprised if C reveals the confidence, nor would C be under a promissory moral obligation not 
to reveal it.  
 
 To the extent, therefore, that an enacted code of ethics recapitulates the requirements of 
morality in its exceptions to the confidentiality principle, clients will be on notice that 
confidentiality is limited [pg777] by other moral norms. Thus, to take an example from the 
Model Rules, clients are put on notice, if they read or hear about the Model Rules, that revealing 
an intent to cause serious physical harm to another person will place upon the attorney the 
power to breach the confidence if necessary to prevent the harm."FN44 However, problems 
arise with respect to each of the three models when we consider this question of notice to the 
client.  
 
 The deontological model presents what is perhaps the least serious problem. Suppose 
that one provision of a code constructed on this model contains an exception to the 
confidentiality rule if a client reveals an intent to cause serious physical harm to a third party. 
While this certainly gives full notice to the client, in fact it may deter him from revealing his 
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intention to his attorney. If the attorney hears nothing, then the attorney has no moral 
obligation. Yet the result is that A harms B. To make the picture morally compelling, assume 
that B is a child and A, a sadist, intends to violently attack the child sexually. Surely the 
important consideration is preventing the harm to B. If the code of ethics puts A on notice, he 
might not reveal his intent to C. Thus, morally speaking, it would have been better for A to 
assume, erroneously, that C would keep the confidence, for in that event C would be in a 
position to stop the planned attack on B. A similar dilemma is faced by psychotherapists as a 
result of the TarasoffFN45 decision in California; the feeling is that violence-prone clients will 
not disclose their intentions to their psychotherapists if the latter are not strictly bound by 
confidentiality.FN46 However, the dilemma may be more real in theory than in practice. 
Neither lawyers nor psychotherapists tend to reveal the limits of confidentiality at the outset of 
their professional relationships with a new client; they are after all trying to instill confidence in 
their clients. Moreover, many persons who are seriously disturbed and intend to commit crimes 
of violence—if they disclose their intent at all—often make their disclosures with some partial 
sense that they want the listener to intercede and stop them. If the lawyer or psychotherapist 
does nothing, the client may feel that society does not care, and thus he proceeds. Perhaps we 
may conclude that it is not too important whether an enacted code of legal ethics contains an 
explicit "moral harm" exception to confidentiality in the deontological model.  
 
 A more serious problem is presented by the autonomy model. Suppose Alternative B of 
the Lawyers' Code is adopted by a state supreme court as the rule for attorneys in that state. 
Then disclosure [pg.778] by C of A's intent to harm B would be grounds for Cs 
disbarment.[FN47] But what happens if B is the child in our previous example? A is secure in 
revealing his intent to C to harm B because he knows that C would be disbarred if the 
confidence were breached. But surely this presents C with an intolerable moral dilemma. C may 
rely on a prediction that the attorney discipline committee of his state will not disbar him for 
revealing this confidence. But then we only have to imagine a series of progressively less 
egregious cases; at some point, although the person in B's position will suffer serious harm, C 
will not breach the confidence (e.g., B is not a child, but is a rather tough individual who might 
be able to "take care of himself" even if suddenly assaulted by A). The very ruling out of 
exceptions to confidentiality for moral transgressions will notify the client that just about 
anything he tells his attorney will be kept in confidence, and that in turn may cause serious 
moral dilemmas for attorneys. Naturally, if keeping confidences were the most important moral 
obligation in the world, then it would not matter what harm might befall B. Even if a client 
revealed an intent to detonate a bomb in a crowded store or hotel lobby, an attorney would still 
keep the confidence as a matter of high morality. But merely noting this possibility 
demonstrates its absurdity. Keeping a confidence is a value but not the most important value, 
and if it is treated as the most important, as in the autonomy model, it may place attorneys in a 
morally untenable position when countervailing moral values seem to call for disclosure.  
 
 At the other extreme, the socialist model, if enacted in a code of legal ethics, might 
operate to destroy the legal profession. Clients would be afraid to tell their attorneys anything, 
and hence might give up going to their attorneys. Suppose a client did something and is unsure 
if it was legal. Typically, a client asks an attorney about the legality of a past act. But he does 
not ask an attorney about the risk that the attorney will blow the whistle if the past act was 
contrary to law. Moreover, what is contrary to law is not necessarily contrary to morality, 
13 
 
which we shall see as we now turn to an examination of the differences among the three models 
with respect to specific questions of confidentiality versus disclosure.  
 
B. The Mutual Exclusivity of the Three Models  
 
 In this subsection we shall attempt to show that the three Models—autonomy, socialist, 
and deontological—are conceptually distinct from each other and, equally important, attempt to 
[pg779] demonstrate the usefulness of applying these models to some specific topics of the 
current debate over confidentiality. Not only do we believe that each of the models throws a 
distinct light on these questions, but also that each of them usefully criticizes the other two. 
Finally, we hope to indicate that the deontological model offers the most satisfactory means for 
bringing a code of professional ethics into congruence with underlying morality—an answer to 
Fried's question: "Can a good lawyer be a good person?"FN48 With respect to most topics, two 
models appear to line up on one side while the third takes the opposite position, even though 
there are slight differences between the paired models. Therefore, we organize this section 
under three headings. Each heading lists one of the models in opposition to the other two. The 
aggregation of the three headings proves as a matter of formal logic that each individual model 
is conceptually distinct from the others.FN49 
 
 1. Autonomy and Deontological Models vs. Socialist Model  
 
 Under the current Model Code of Professional Responsibility (hereinafter Model Code), 
Model Rules, and Lawyer's Code, attorney-client confidentiality is to be maintained in all but 
exceptional circumstances.FN50 The rationale for this general rule of confidentiality, as we 
have previously argued in subsection A of this section, lies in the asserted importance of 
confidentiality to the promotion of the positive attorney-client relationship, and in the 
significance that relationship has in the provision of zealous legal representation. Given 
confidentiality's asserted value, it is hardly surprising that exceptions to the general rule have 
been recognized under the codes only in the face of truly compelling countervailing 
concerns.FN51 
 
 [pg780] a) Completed Conduct: Client's Admission of Guilt  
 
 Let us consider the representation of a client who has admitted to his lawyer that he is 
guilty of a crime. This situation leads to a clash between the rules of confidentiality generated 
by the autonomy and deontological models on the one hand, and the socialist model on the 
other, and hence provides a clear distinction for our analysis.  
 
 In this situation, the autonomy and deontological models would both require 
confidentiality and nondisclosure of the client's confession. Echoing the autonomy view, Fried 
has said that our legal system assures the liberty of each citizen by entitling him to zealous legal 
representation.FN52 If Freedman asserts without qualification that zealous representation in 
this situation entitles the client to the preservation of his confidences and promotion of his 
interests before the legal tribunal.FN53 Thus, an ultimate determination of guilt or innocence 




 In concurring with the result reached by the autonomy model, the deontological model 
focuses upon the fact that an accused individual faces deprivation of life or liberty by the state. 
Justice as a branch of morality dictates that such an individual should be so deprived only if he 
in fact committed a crime under the generally applicable laws of a fundamentally just 
society.FN55 This formulation, however, raises an immediate question for an attorney under 
the deontological model: "Should the attorney represent such a client?"  
 
 If the attorney is wholly convinced that the client is guilty (because, e.g., she believes 
the client's admission of guilt is truthful), we see no overriding moral reasons why the attorney 
must take the case. But suppose she is the "last lawyer in town." Even though the client might 
have a constitutional right to an attorney, the deontological model is not necessarily coextensive 
with the Bill of Rights. Rather, the Constitution presents a dilemma for the state; the State 
cannot convict the accused person without an attorney and yet the [pg781] attorney is the "last 
lawyer in town." Yet this alone does not mean that the attorney has a moral obligation to defend 
the accused person. Indeed, many practicing attorneys refuse to represent persons the attorneys 
believe are guilty of a crime. These attorneys are exercising a moral choice. Under a 
deontological view, it would be immoral to compel them to defend guilty clients. Yet much 
mythology and many "codes of ethics" suggest that an attorney has an ethical obligation to 
defend a guilty client. Clarity would be promoted if it were recognized that although an 
attorney may represent a guilty client, she is under no ethical obligation to do so.FN56 
 
 But beyond the immediate question of representation, let us suppose that the attorney 
believes the client's admission of guilt. Should she now disclose that admission to the 
authorities, and perhaps even appear as a witness to the confession in the subsequent trial? 
Under the socialist model, this would be the mandated result. Upon discovering that the client is 
guilty, the socialist attorney would make sure that the state was informed so that the state might 
lake appropriate rehabilitative, or perhaps punitive, measures. 
 
 In contrast, the deontological model would not favor disclosure. In considering the 
precise interests involved, the case under discussion does not present a threat of ongoing or 
future harm to other persons; if it did, as we will discuss later in this article,FN57 the disclosure 
outcome would be different. The harm to the victim of the crime in this case occurred in the 
past; the client himself is the only one who is now at risk (the risk of suffering the state's 
sanction).FN58 If the client is innocent, then he has a vitally important interest in legal 
representation to prove his innocence. If he is guilty, concededly he does not have this interest 
under the deontological model. If our attorney does not know whether the client is innocent or 
guilty, then on the chance that the client is innocent the attorney should consider representing 
the client and should certainly not disclose confidences. Given the importance of the client's 
interest at stake, even a fractional probability of innocence is enough to tip the moral scales, in 
the absence of countervailing interests.  
 
 But there is inevitably a fractional probability of innocence. Even the client's admission 
of guilt does not reduce to zero the likelihood of innocence. Many people have been self-
deluded for all kinds of psychological reasons; they may be pathological confessors 
masochistically seeking punishment at the hands of the state, they may have [pg782] been 
tricked by others (e.g., hypnotists) into believing their own guilt, or they may be trying to 
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protect friends by "taking the rap." Any possibility of innocence should enable an attorney to 
mount a vigorous defense in clear conscience and leave the ultimate question of guilt to a jury. 
Thus, under the deontological model, it follows that there should be no breach of 
confidentiality.  
 
 In addition to the interest of the deontological model in protecting an innocent person 
from unjust conviction, there is a further interest to be vindicated under this model. 
Preservation of the integrity of society and its judicial institutions demands that even a guilty 
client be represented by an attorney. Lon Fuller argued that equal access to the judicial system 
by all citizens helps ensure that the processes used by society to condemn and punish erring 
members will remain "sound and wholesome.  Indeed, denying access to guilty clients seals 
their fate and renders the fairness of the judicial system suspect. No just society can convict a 
citizen summarily by foreclosing entry to legal processes. Thus, in representing a guilty client, 
the attorney "represents a vital interest of society itself, [and] plays an essential role in one of 
the fundamental processes" of a just society. FN60 
 
 b) Contemplated Conduct: Intent to Commit a Minor Violation  
 
 In contrast to the example just discussed where the crime was committed in the past, 
how do the three models differ with respect to whether an attorney should disclose her client's 
admitted intent to commit a crime in the future? As we shall see later in this article,FN61 much 
depends on the kind of crime intended. Here, let us consider a nonviolent "violation" or "minor 
misdemeanor" type of offense that causes no significant harm to other persons (e.g., leaving 
one's car parked beyond the meter limit, driving a car that has no license plate, smoking a 
marijuana cigarette, or a minor purchasing and drinking a bottle of beer).  
 
 Under the socialist model the assumption would be that society enacted all of its 
criminal legislation to prohibit the proscribed conduct [pg783] and hence society benefits 
whenever any criminal action, major or minor, is deterred. Thus the socialist model would 
require the attorney to disclose a client's intent to commit any crime. Interestingly, the present 
Model Code on its face allows the same disclosure: "A lawyer may reveal ... [t]he intention of 
his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."FN62 To be 
sure, some commentators read this provision as allowing disclosure only for serious 
crimes.FN63 On the other hand, the way one reads the Model Code may depend upon which of 
the three models of legal ethics the reader consciously or subconsciously has in mind. Under 
the socialist model, the reader would be impelled not only to draw no distinctions between 
serious and nonserious crimes, but also to read "may reveal" as "must reveal."  
 
 The autonomy model, on the other hand, would not allow disclosure of a client's 
intention to commit a minor violation, an a fortiori consequence of that model's emphasis upon 
the value of confidentiality. Only in the most egregious circumstances would a breach of 
confidentiality be permissible to those who adopt the autonomy model, and even then (e.g., 
where a client announces an intent to commit murder) it appears to be a grudging ad hoc 




 The deontological model, grounded in morality and not in any one particular legal 
system, would draw a distinction not between major and minor "crimes" but rather between 
substantial and insubstantial harms to third persons, for any criminal enactment by a [pg784] 
state does not make the proscribed conduct immoral any more than it would make it harmful to 
other persons. For example, parking beyond the time on the parking meter would cause some 
inconvenience to others who might want to park in that spot, but this harm is normally 
insubstantial, unless a person parks in a proscribed zone that might block an ambulance or fire 
truck. Of course this is an example of a minor violation, but we can imagine a society where 
even a major crime might be neither harmful or immoral (e.g., laws  making it a major crime in 
Nazi Germany for Aryans to marry non-Aryans, or laws in South Africa making it a crime for 
blacks to marry whites). However, in the United States today, the distinction between major 
crimes and minor violations generally tracks the distinction between immoral and moral 
conduct. To the extent that this is true, the deontological model would generally line up with 
the autonomy model regarding nondisclosure of a client's intent to commit a minor violation, 
given our previous argument that the deontological model finds prima facie moral value in 
preserving confidentiality. FN65 
 
 c) Continuing Conduct 
 
 A celebrated final example that tests the position of the three models involves 
representing a guilty client when the consequences of that client's past conduct may have 
continuing or future implications to third persons. In People v. Belge the court and an ethics 
committee found that a lawyer acted properly by not disclosing the location of the buried bodies 
of his client's victims.FN66 The autonomy model would clearly concur in the result reached by 
the court and ethics [pg785]committee. The socialist model would just as clearly dissent on the 
grounds of rehabilitating the defendant and preventing continuing harm to the victims' families 
and society.  
 
 The deontological model is a harder case, although it would ultimately preserve 
confidentiality. While the outraged public's reaction to the attorney's failure to inform police in 
Belge may suggest a value more important than confidentiality,FN67 we agree with the result 
reached by the New York court. However, it does test our notion of what constitutes 
"substantial" harms to third persons. In Belge, the third persons affected were the parents of the 
victims. The students had been missing for several months, and because the attorneys did not 
disclose the whereabouts of the bodies, the parents did not discover that their children were 
dead for nine additional months. Is this added measure of uncertainty a "substantial" harm to 
the parents? We do not think so in this case, though of course a more aggravated situation 
might call for a different result. The case has been sharply debated,FN68 and differences of 
opinion are surely possible as to whether the harm to the parents was "substantial." The 
deontological model only requires that the question of substantial harm be addressed and 
compared to the value in preserving confidences.FN69  
 




 Contrasting the socialist and deontological models against the autonomy model will 
produce further distinctions. As a first area of comparison, let us consider the problem of 
disclosure of perjury.  
 
 a) Completed Conduct: Does Perjury Constitute Harm to the Justice System?  
 
 Let us suppose that a client, called to testify in his own case, [pg786] makes a material 
statement his lawyer knows to be false. Should the attorney thereupon disclose the perjury to 
the judge, breaking his client's confidence? In a criminal case, the answer may be negative 
solely for constitutional reasons.FN70 But what about a civil case?  
 
 The autonomy model would answer negatively in the civil case as well. Freedman has 
frequently stated his belief that confidentiality is the overriding value in the attorney-client 
relationship.FN71 Given this philosophy, when all private remedial efforts have failed and a 
client still insists on giving perjured testimony, a lawyer's obligation of confidentiality 
"apparently allows the attorney no alternative to putting a perjurious witness on the stand 
without explicit or implicit disclosure of the attorney's knowledge to either the judge or the 
jury."FN72 
 
 Further buttressing Freedman's position is the Lawyer's Code, which appears to be the 
baldest statement of the autonomy model:  
 
A lawyer representing the wife in a divorce and custody case learns from his client that she had sexual 
relations with a man other than her husband during the time of separation. [T]he wife testifies falsely on 
deposition that she has not had sexual relations with anyone other than her husband during the marriage. 
The lawyer would commit a disciplinary violation by revealing the perjury."FN73 
 
 The excerpt clearly demonstrates the extraordinary value placed upon confidentiality by 
the autonomy model. In contrast, the socialist model, valuing the administration of justice, 
attempting to deter any crime (including perjury) and placing a high value on truth (in part 
because of the goal of rehabilitating persons who act contrary to the expressed and legislated 
values of society), would require the attorney to reveal the perjury.  
 
 The present Model Code requires the attorney—when other means, such as persuading 
the client to rectify the fraud fail,—to "reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal."FN74 
Some states, however, have adopted an amendment that seems to eviscerate this requirement. 
FN75 The Model Rules reaffirm and perhaps even [pg787] strengthen the Model Code on this 
issue, though they clearly except, in limited instances, criminal cases for constitutional 
reasons.FN76 
 
 The deontological model approaches but does not replicate the socialist model, while it 
differs substantially from the autonomy model. We must first investigate the problem of 
attorney participation in the perjury.  
 
 Although most people would agree that an attorney may not sign a tax return which she 
knows contains materially false statements, a much harder case is presented when an attorney is 
surprised by her client's perjurious testimony at trial. Merely by sitting there and saying 
18 
 
nothing, the attorney may be giving the impression to judge and jury that the client's testimony 
is true. By so acquiescing in the false testimony, she may be participating in the perjury.  
 
 While a code of professional conduct may be fashioned to define an attorney's conduct 
in this situation as not endorsing the truth of what her client is saying, and thereby avoid any 
attorney "participation" in the perjury, the question remains whether a code of ethics should 
exempt attorneys from participating in such perjury. We believe not. Perjury is itself a wrong; it 
is a deliberate injury to the mind of the listener who has a right to expect that the speaker will 
utter the truth.FN77 Moreover, we believe it would be debilitating for the legal profession over 
the long run to feel that it has no moral duty to object when perjury is committed because of a 
casuistic exemption promulgated in, of all places, a code of professional ethics.FN78 Thus, 
with nothing more, acquiescing in a perjury is tantamount to participating in it. 
 
 We are therefore compelled to draw an initial distinction that, in fact, is found in many 
draft codes of legal ethics: the attorney may not actively participate in perjury, such as signing a 
fraudulent tax return. The additional question arises, however, whether she may passively 
participate by remaining silent when she knows that her client is lying. In the absence of any 
further considerations, we believe that the attorney may not remain silent in this situation, 
because by doing so she would participate in the perjury.  
 
 [pg788] But there can be further considerations. Suppose an attorney is given the task of 
defending a guilty client (the attorney is the public defender, or is perhaps the "last lawyer in 
town"). The client insists upon taking the stand and tells the attorney that he will try to lie his 
way out of a conviction. From what we said previously, the attorney should not participate 
actively in the perjury by, for instance, endorsing its truthfulness to the court. But in order to 
conduct the defense, the attorney will have to ask the client questions knowing that the client's 
answers will be false and yet not betray that falsity to the jury. How can this level of 
acquiescence in the perjury be tolerated? The deontological model would build upon its answer 
to the previously discussed problem of not disclosing a client's guilt. The reason we gave in that 
example is that there is always a possibility that the client may be lying to his attorney in stating 
his guilt or may genuinely be mistaken as to that fact.FN79 But if those were possibilities in our 
hypothetical, it follows that it is possible in our perjury case that the attorney may be mistaken 
in her belief that her client is lying. The moral interest at stake in both of these cases is that an 
innocent person should not be subjected to criminal punishment. This moral interest appears 
sufficiently strong to overcome the passive participation by the attorney in the perjury. 
Moreover, the previous fears of "contamination" by the attorney in the perjury is least likely in 
the criminal case, since "everyone knows" that a guilty person is entitled to a vigorous 
defense—a defense that might proceed even though the defense attorney knows that the client is 
guilty and hence is lying. And even if everyone does not know this fact, at the outset of any 
criminal case a judge may easily apprise the jury that the defense attorney, in order to conduct a 
vigorous defense which is the client's right, may have to condone perjurious statements. (Query: 
Is this prejudicial? Perhaps it depends upon how the judge words it.)  
 
 But there is another moral interest that we must take into account in assessing whether 
an attorney should passively acquiesce in perjury. If the result of the perjury is to threaten harm 
to a third person (e.g., to cheat that person out of property), then the attorney should disclose 
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the perjury. In a criminal case it could come up this way: A client has robbed a bank, pleads not 
guilty, but tells his attorney where the loot is stashed. The perjury here (which may indeed be 
the plea of "not guilty" as well as any positive statements the accused might make on the 
witness stand) has the effect of depriving the bank of its property. The attorney should inform 
the client that there is no attorney-client confidentiality with respect to the location of the loot, 
that the best thing is for the attorney to phone in an "anonymous tip" to the bank or the police 
describing where the money can be found and recovered, but if that is not done, then the 
[pg789] attorney must reveal the perjury in court. As the latter course of action would impair 
the client's constitutional right to counsel, the former "anonymous tip" approach seems ethically 
required. Then at trial, if the client says that he never knew where the loot was located (as part 
of his defense that he did not rob the bank), that perjury would have no future effect upon the 
bank (since the loot has been recovered after the "anonymous tip"), and hence can be condoned 
under the principles we have advocated.  
 
 In any civil case, on the other hand, where a sum of money is involved as potential 
damages, perjury by either side would tend to cheat the other side of its property interest. In 
these cases, our position is that the deontological model would require disclosure of the perjury 
to the court if the attorney is unable (by pretrial coaching) to talk the client out of committing 
the perjury. The attorney in this case cannot remain passive by allowing the perjury to take 
place. The combination of perjury plus harm to another's interest is enough to overcome 
whatever value is assigned to confidentiality.  
 
 Why wouldn't the deontological model simply hold that all perjury is excluded from the 
rules protecting confidentiality, with a simple exception that a defense attorney not reveal her 
knowledge that her client is guilty or is lying? The answer is threefold. First, even in a criminal 
case, if the result of the perjury is to harm a third party's substantial interest (e.g., our bank loot 
case), the perjury should not be privileged. Second, if a client makes a statement that is 
immaterial, the attorney should not be required to reveal the perjury to the court, even if it is 
held to be perjurious.FN80 Third, suppose the substantive law itself is immoral; in that event 
the perjury would not be immoral. For instance, if a person were accused in Nazi Germany of 
being a Jew, and he denied that fact with the knowledge that admission would probably mean 
being transported to a death camp, then his attorney should not be required to reveal the perjury 
to the tribunal. This example admittedly is a rarity, but it does show the sharp distinction 
between the socialist model, which would require disclosure, and the deontological model.  
 
 b)  Contemplated Conduct: Intent to Commit Serious Harm to a Third Party  
 
 We have previously discussed the client's intention to commit a minor violation;FN81 
there the autonomy and deontological models concluded that the attorney should not disclose 
the confidence, whereas the socialist model would require disclosure. Turning now to [pg790] 
examples of rules of attorney conduct that distinguish the autonomy model from the other two, 
let us examine a client's intention to commit acts that would cause serious harm to third 
parties.FN82 We will consider two different kinds of acts: first, a client's intention to commit an 
act of fraud that could cause serious financial harm to a third party, and second, a client's 




 i) Client's Intent to Commit Fraud  
 
 The autonomy model requires nondisclosure in the case of a client's intent to commit a 
fraudulent act. Relying on the general justification for confidentiality from the autonomy 
perspective, Freedman asserts that only with an assurance of confidentiality will the client fully 
disclose his affairs to his attorney.FN83 But for confidentiality, the attorney would not even 
know of the client's intention.  
 
 Of course, upon learning of the client's intention, the attorney may privately try to 
dissuade the client from undertaking the contemplated conduct. However, the client may not 
accept the attorney's advice and may proceed with the conduct anyway. If this happens the 
attorney has no right under the autonomy model to blow the whistle on her client. Indeed, the 
autonomy model has been criticized because the attorney's inability to blow the whistle makes 
it difficult for her to convince the client to change his mind."FN84 Nevertheless, the autonomy 
model insists on confidentiality even if the act of fraud is a crime and, as we have seen, even for 
other crimes that would result in serious harms to third parties.FN85 
 
 The new Model Rules omit any intended-fraud exception to confidentiality, even though 
all the drafts of the Model Rules up to the final document contained such an exception."FN86 
Clearly the new Model [pg791] Rules draw a sharp distinction between physical and financial 
harm. A cynic might speculate that lawyers see no harm in a client's intent to defraud a third 
person because the legal profession itself charges unconscionably high fees for its services. But 
on a more serious level of criticism, the distinction between physical and financial harms is 
ultimately problematic. A person who is defrauded and financially ruined could thus be 
deprived of essential shelter or nutrition that could have serious health consequences; his or her 
dependents could suffer physically from the financial ruination. Even in moral theory it may be 
said that a person's earned wealth is as close or closer to personhood than a person's physical 
health; one has to work hard to make money.  
 
 Thus, the deontological model would differ sharply from the new Model Rules. Under 
the former, the intent to cause serious financial harm to a third party would morally outweigh 
the interest in preserving confidentiality. The question of what is "serious" in this formulation, 
like any moral standard, would have to depend upon a reasonable and disinterested assessment. 
The problem is no different in assessing what is "serious" when physical harm is at stake. 
Under the Model Rules, there is an exception to confidentiality for intended criminal acts that 
are likely to result in "substantial bodily harm."FN87 Perhaps ethical standards cannot be made 
more specific than sentences using terms such as "serious" or "substantial."  
 
 In contrast to the new Model Rules which adopt the autonomy model, both the socialist 
and the deontological models clearly would allow disclosure of a client's intent to defraud a 
third party. As we have seen, the deontological model would require serious financial harm, 
whereas the sociological model probably would be satisfied with considerably less than serious 
harm.  
 




 Turning to a consideration of general harms to the public, let us now examine the case 
of a client's intention to distribute adulterated food on the market. This case poses difficult and 
troubling concerns for the rules of attorney conduct under the three models. It is unclear, for 
example, whether the intended conduct actually constitutes a criminal act. Furthermore, the 
threatened harm is not directed to any specific individual; rather, the harm threatens the public 
as a whole. Yet although the victims may not be identifiable, the harm is clear and forseeable.  
 
 Many attorneys would surely be uncomfortable in this situation. Disclosure of a client's 
intention to distribute the contaminated product might prompt the client to censure or remove 
the attorney from [pg792] any sphere of influence over the client's affairs. Such a result could 
cripple the attorney's immediate economic welfare. On the other hand, failure to disclose may 
be morally intolerable. Let us consider the resolution of this case under each model's rules of 
attorney conduct.  
 
 To make our case more realistic, suppose an attorney represents a food company which 
intends to adulterate one of its food products with a coloring additive in order to enhance the 
food's appearance. Before the food product is actually distributed, however, the company 
receives a report from its laboratory that the additive causes cancer in laboratory mice. 
Moreover, the findings of the experiments are conclusive; the additive significantly increases 
the risk that laboratory mice will contract cancer.  
 
 Upon learning this information, the company consults its attorney and requests her 
advice about marketing the food product. Despite her advice not to distribute it, however, the 
company concludes that it must distribute the adulterated food product in order to recoup its 
investment. The company explains that it has invested a substantial amount of money in the 
preparation of the food product, and that at this late date it cannot afford to change the 
composition or appearance of the product. For this reason, the company informs the attorney 
that it does not want her to disclose the presence of the additive in the food, or any of the 
company's actions regarding its distribution of the product. Instead, the company states that it is 
prepared to pay damages in tort which may arise from consumption of the food product, 
believing that this alternative will be less costly than disclosure. Indeed, it asks the attorney to 
begin research on defending such cases in the event that they arise. What value should the 
lawyer place on confidentiality in this situation?  
 
 Under the autonomy model confidentiality would again prevail, as the lawyer would 
give primacy to client interests. She might not personally agree with the client's decision, and 
may even privately advise disclosure, but she should not disclose on her own. As in the 
hypothetical involving fraud,FN88 confidentiality would prevail over moral concerns. We 
suspect most lawyers would concur with the result reached under the autonomy model. Under 
the socialist model, however, the lawyer would disclose the impending harm in order to protect 
the public.  
 
 The deontological model would suggest, of course, that the lawyer first privately urge 
the client to disclose. In the event that action failed, however, disclosure would be permissible 
and preferable. Distributing carcinogenic food is too substantial and foreseeable a harm to be 
ignored. The ethical concern in preventing serious physical harm supersedes confidentiality. 
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Indeed, any person, [pg793] not just a lawyer, who learns of this hidden threat should disclose 
the imminent harm in order to safeguard life. Fundamental ethical principles should apply alike 
to nonlawyers. Under the deontological model, we argue that confidentiality should not serve as 
a barrier to disclosure in cases involving substantial and forseeable harms to the public.  
 
 3. Autonomy and Socialist Models vs. Deontological Model  
 
 a) General Considerations  
 
 From what has been said so far in this article, the autonomy and socialist models would 
clearly make strange bedfellows, and indeed it is not easy to find examples where they align 
together against the deontological model. However, there are situations in which this strange 
line-up emerges, ultimately revealing the ethical poverty of the autonomy perspective.  
 
 The present Model Code, the Model Rules, and the Lawyer's Code each contain an 
exception to confidentiality when disclosure is required by law. The Model Code permits 
disclosure "when required by law or court order,"FN89 the Lawyer's Code when "required to do 
so by law, rule of court, or court order,"FN90 and the Model Rules when there are "final orders 
of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information 
about the client."FN91These provisions clearly accord with the socialist model of legal ethics, 
in which the confidentiality rule itself is extremely weak. Any "law" or "court order" would by 
definition reflect the public will, and hence there can be no confidentiality barrier to disclosure 
that is legally mandated. More interestingly, the "required by law" exception is accepted by all 
advocates of the autonomy model.FN92 
 
 In contrast, the deontological model would find it difficult to allow the "law" or the 
"court order" to trump the moral value in confidentiality, a value which, as we have seen, 
includes the implicit promise to the client to remain silent coupled with the value of providing 
everyone with access to attorneys. One moral value can only be overcome, in deontological 
theory, by a more compelling moral [pg794] value that conflicts with it. Thus the question must 
arise in each case:  "What is the moral content of the 'law' or 'court order' that requires 
disclosure?"  
 
 One might have thought that the autonomy model, which places such a high value upon 
attorney-client confidentiality, would not give way so readily to any law or court order that 
requires breach of a confidence. To inquire why this is so goes to the heart of the autonomy 
model enterprise. A clue is found in Professor Hodes' comment that a court order to an attorney 
to reveal a confidence "extinguishes one horn of the dilemma, the originally valid duty of 
silence."FN93 A code of professional ethics is thus inferentially viewed by Hodes as similar to 
any other legal code, subject to displacement by another law or court order. Undoubtedly, many 
attorneys regard the Model Code as rules that they must cope with in practice, and if the rules 
are changed or overridden, that fact is of no more moment than the ordinary occurrence of a 
legislature passing a new statute. A practicing attorney once remarked to one of the authors: "I 
make it my business to know what it is in the Code of Professional Responsibility, because I 
want to know how much I can get away with." The ultimate import of this reasoning finds 
expression in a statement  quoted with approval by Hodes from a source he was unable to 
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locate: "If it comes down to a situation in which either you or your client must go to jail, make 
sure it's your client."FN94 
 
 The autonomy model, we conclude, is not really a set of ethical requirements so much 
as it is legislation reflecting the self-interest of practicing attorneys. It overlaps with ethical 
rules here and there, but is not necessarily an ethical vision of legal practice. Most 
fundamentally, if the client's "autonomy" is the desideratum, there is certainly no moral 
component to that; it would be like saying that anything a client wants, however immoral it 
might be, is moral, a clearly incoherent position. To be sure, there is an element of selflessness 
for the attorney that has a "moral" appearance; the attorney is acting in the interests of someone 
else. But if that person is acting immorally, the attorney, by aiding and abetting that conduct for 
a price, cannot be said to be acting ethically. Thus, the rules of attorney-client confidentiality 
foster the profession of law, but not necessarily because there is any moral value in 
confidentiality. Under the current Model Code, a lawyer may reveal a confidence if necessary to 
collect a fee from a c1ient,FN95 certainly a strange exception if we are talking about a moral 
value for confidentiality. Additionally, advertising for legal services, until the recent Supreme 
Court [pg795] decision that approved lawyer advertising, FN96 was prohibited by the Model 
Code—not for any moral reason in the "advertising age"—but probably for the very self-
serving, monopolistic reasons that the Supreme Court found offensive under the antitrust laws. 
Of course, if the autonomy model is not grounded in ethical considerations, nevertheless it may 
serve as a legislative expression of professional self-interest that helps define the profession and 
police deviationists. To that extent, at least, it deserves equal consideration with the other two 
models presented in this article.  
 
 b) Examples  
 
 Suppose in the pre-Civil War era a fugitive slave in a southern state finds a lawyer and 
asks for advice concerning his legal rights. Suppose further that there is a law in that state 
requiring anyone who knows the whereabouts of a fugitive slave to notify the police 
immediately. The lawyer satisfies herself after a few questions that her new client is indeed a 
fugitive slave and that there are no defenses available to him. The lawyer has a one hundred 
percent degree of confidence that the police will return the slave to the slave's owner, who will 
severely beat the slave for attempting to escape. Under the autonomy and the socialist models, 
as well as under all three codes of ethics that we have been examining, the law requiring 
disclosure is an exception to the rule of confidentiality, and hence the lawyer has no 
confidentiality barrier to the disclosure. Indeed, a careful examination by Hodes of all three 
codes in a similar context (a fugitive from justice or a military deserter) concludes that the 
codes command, rather than simply allow, voluntary disclosure by the attorney.FN97 
 
 The deontological model, in contrast, views a code of professional responsibility as 
containing ethical standards. Surely a code of professional ethics cannot ethically require that 
an attorney obey any and all laws, since a law may itself be immoral (e.g., fugitive slave 
law).FN98  Nor should the confidentiality barrier, which has moral value, be overcome by any 
law, including an immoral law. Confidentiality may only be trumped by a value higher than 
confidentiality, such as the examples we have previously considered (e.g., preventing serious 




 [pg796] Proponents of the autonomy model might object to the foregoing fugitive-slave 
example as not being what they had in mind when they accepted the "required by law" 
exception to confidentiality. Fried, for example, might say that the goal of maximizing client 
autonomy does not apply to unjust laws. In his analysis he states, "I am not considering at all 
the moral dilemmas of a lawyer in Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia."FN100 But is this exclusion 
defensible or is it an ad hoc dismissal of an argument that would damage his autonomy thesis? 
Surely at some point in their evolution the legal systems of Nazi Germany, South Africa, Soviet 
Russia, or pre-Civil War United States did not seem pathological to attorneys working within 
them. The morality of such systems goes through many shades of gray before reaching black. 
More importantly, if a legal system is on its way toward becoming generally immoral, the only 
chance to upset the trend is in the early days when resistance to unjust laws is still possible. 
Hitler, after all, came to power "legally"; despite the early signs of what his regime would be 
like, most lawyers and judges went about their business, refusing to question the laws. 
Professor Cover has delineated the moral dilemmas of pre·Civil War judges who applied the 
fugitive slave laws,FN101 judges who believed that the legal system was "generally just and 
decent" (to use Fried's phrase).FN102 
 
 But perhaps a different objection may be adduced for proponents of the autonomy 
model. They might argue that the "autonomy" of the fugitive slave clearly cannot be promoted 
by turning him in, and therefore the three codes should contain an exception to the "required by 
law" exception that in some sense preserves client autonomy. Of course, any such exception 
would be extremely difficult to put into words, and any attempt to do so would probably have 
to be drafted in overly inclusive terms that would, of necessity, include any case in which a 
client wants to preserve his "autonomy" by avoiding prison—cases not only of bail jumpers and 
prison escapees, but also of persons who want to hide incriminating evidence to avoid 
conviction.FN103 But let us assume for the moment that such an exception to the exception can 
be drafted. A moral problem still arises if we consider the following variation on the fugitive-
slave hypothetical. Suppose the fugitive slave escapes to a northern state [pg797] by means of 
the "underground railroad," and a prosecutor, learning that the attorney has contacted the 
fugitive, obtains a court order compelling the attorney to disclose the fugitive's whereabouts. 
The prosecutor, in reality, is interested in exposing and destroying the underground railroad 
system. The prosecutor obtains a counter-order guaranteeing immunity to the slave if his 
present location is revealed. In this variation, the "autonomy" of the client will be preserved 
since the slave will not be prosecuted or sent back. Thus, the attorney's moral obligation is to 
other fugitive slaves using the underground railroad, and no longer particularly to her client. 
Under the deontological model, but not under the other two models, the moral value in 
preserving confidentiality has not been overcome by the "law" since the law in this case is itself 
an immoral component of the slavery system.  
 
 Finally, the autonomist might object that the slavery example is, after all, from a 
different era, and that unjust laws are harder to find today. However, with a few changes, the 
example can be modified to a present day situation of a foreigner who seeks legal advice to 
avoid extradition. Suppose a dictatorial regime that is a military ally of the United States seeks 
extradition of a political opponent of that regime who is accused of the political crime of 
publishing a newspaper critical of the regime. Suppose further that there is either no "political 
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offense" exception to the particular treaty between the United States and the dictatorship, or that 
the State Department is given final authority to determine the offense and has wrongly 
concluded that it is not a "political offense." In short, the client has done nothing other than 
politically oppose an oppressive regime with friendly ties to the United States, and if he is 
extradited, he will probably be imprisoned, and perhaps tortured and killed. Again, assume that 
the law requires that the attorney disclose the client's whereabouts. In this case, it is harder to 
say that the international law of extradition is immoral; indeed, one can always assume that the 
person extradited will get a fair trial in his home country and thus we can wash our hands of the 
matter. The autonomy and socialist models clearly would require disclosure, and the three 
codes allow, if not compel, disclosure in this case. But under the deontological model, the 
moral value in confidentiality has not been eclipsed by the law requiring disclosure. To be sure, 
the law itself is not part of an immoral system (as was the fugitive slave law), but the result of 
obeying it will be unjust harm to the political-dissident client at the hands of the dictatorship.  
 
 Under the socialist model, the phrase "immoral system" has no meaning, because the 
interests of society as a whole, expressed through the legal system, define the content of 
morality. In theory it is a utilitarian conception; the aggregate social good is realized through 
legislation regardless of the "morality" of its impact upon [pg798] an individual.FN104 From a 
deontological point of view, it is inconsistent to be able to generate an immoral result (impact 
upon the individual) from a moral premise (the good of society), but the socialist would answer 
that whatever society wants cannot by definition be deemed immoral at the individual level. 
Hence, under the socialist model, disclosure in the fugitive-slave or extradition examples would 
be defined as moral if the social system condones slavery FN105 or extradition of the type we 
have posited.  
 
 The morality of utilitarianism has been widely disputed, FN106 but on its own premises 
it has not seemed incoherent to many philosophers or to many nations living under that system 
today. What of the converse of utilitarianism? Imagine a philosophy holding that the good of 
the individual, as defined by the individual, is the paramount goal. Such a philosophy is called 
"egotism" and most philosophers would agree that egotism that allows unrestrained behavior by 
any individual cannot be "moral."FN107 We have concluded that surrogate egotism, in which 
one person acts on behalf of another's unbridled egotism, constitutes the "autonomy" model of 




 We have attempted in this article to present and describe three models of legal ethics—
the autonomy model that gives primacy to the desires or interests of the client, the socialist 
model that places overriding value on the interests of the state or society, and the deontological 
model that elevates the dictates of morality above both the client and society. Each of these 
models opposes the other two; each is a criticism of the others. Thus the models serve a critical 
function in the ongoing analysis of proposals for a new code of professional ethics for lawyers.  
 
 The models may be applied to the new Model Rules. We have applied them in this 
article only to controversies concerning attorney-client confidentiality, because confidentiality 
presents some of the hardest and most heavily debated issues in professional ethics, and 
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because the moral values in the confidentiality problem illustrate well the differences among 
the three models. Although our preferred position [pg799] is to apply the deontological model 
critically and heuristically to the issue of confidentiality, we will be quite satisfied if our 
discussion of this topic at least contributes a third alternative to the debate that so far has been 
conducted upon the assumption that any deviation from the autonomy model is a move toward 
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FNl. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (l983) [hereinafter also cited as  
Model Rules]. A copy of the final edition of the Model Rules can be found in 52  U.S.L.W. 1, 1-
27 (Aug. 16, 1983). According to Lennine Occhino of the American  Bar Association Center 
for Professional Responsibility, the Model Rules will be published in October of 1983.  
 
 A good source for some contrasting viewpoints concerning the Model Rules, then in 
proposed form, is Panel Discussion. 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 639 (1981).  Among the panelists in 
that discussion are Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reporter for the Model Rules, and 
Professor Monroe H. Freedman, Reporter for the alternative. The American Lawyer's Code of 
Conduct. See infra note 23. Professor Hodes provides a fuller examination of the Model Rules 
and argues that, contrary to stereotype, the Model Rules do not propose radical readjustment of 
the lawyer's role in the adversary system. See Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, 
The Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 739 (1981). Contra Koskoff & Lumbard, Breach of  Faith: The Kutak Rules, 3 U. 
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 1 (1981) and Lumbard, Setting  Standards: The Courts, The Bar, and the 
Lawyer's Code of Conduct, 30 CATH. U.L.  REV. 249 (1981) (Model Rules propose radical 
readjustment of the lawyer's role in society). 
 
FN2. In his book, M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS], and in various articles Professor 
Freedman has argued that a lawyer is the "champion" of his client in the  fight against the legal 
resources of society and the awesome police and military power of the state. See Freedman, 
Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. V.L. REV. 191 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as Freedman, Personal Responsibility]; Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the 
Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as Freedman, Three Hardest Questions]. Similarly, Professor Fried has 
asserted that a lawyer should actively promote the interests or needs of his client at the expense 
of third  parties or the public at large. See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations  
of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). But see Dauer & Leff, 
Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573 (1977) (Fried's theory of client 




FN3. That this dichotomy should not exist in the human rights (moral) area is argued in 
D'Amato, Are Human Rights Good for International Business?, 1 NW. J. INT'L. L. & BUS. 22 
1979).  
 
FN4. Fried, supra note 2, at 1066.  
 
FN5. Id. at 1073.  
 
FN6. Id. at 1075.  
 
FN7. Id. at 1078.  
 
FN8. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER’S ETHICS, supra note 2, at 2-4. 
 
FN9. Id. at 4. 
 
FN10. See Id. at 2-4. 
 
FN11. Fried, supra note 2, at 1066. 
 
FN12. The idea of "society" here is ill-defined in the writings of those who champion the 
autonomy model. They may mean that if everyone has an attorney, then everyone in society has 
an attorney, and hence society benefits. But obviously that defines away "society" as anything 
other than the individuals in it. Yet we know that "society" may take a position against certain 
individuals (e.g., minorities), and is quite capable of deciding, in its aggregate self-interest, that 
if all lawyers were eliminated "society" would be better off because lawyers could no longer 
represent minority groups. Cf. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 163-
207 (R. Wolff ed. 1969) (universalization of what is desirable for an individual to what is 
desirable for everyone).  
 
FN13. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 18-22 (1974).  
 
FN14. See Dauer & Leff, supra note 2.  
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"godfather" himself. See M. PUZO, THE GODFATHER (1969).  
 
FN17. See generally Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 
1 (1975) for a discussion of two moral criticisms against lawyers concerning their stance in the 




FN18. In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967), aff’d, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967). 
 
FN19. Of course, there are "minor virtues" in friendship. See I. KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 209 
(L. Infield ed. 1963).  
 
FN20. See the discussion of side constraints in R. NOZICK, supra note 13, at 28-33.  
 
FN21. See, e.g., Becker, Modern Discovery: Promoting Efficient Use and Preventing Abuse of 
Discovery in the Roscoe Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267,  270-71, 277 (1978); Flegal & Umin, 
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B.Y.U. L. REV. 579. 
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FN35. Kant’s specific example was that of a person who intends to murder your sister asking 
you if your sister is at home. If in fact she is at home, Kant requires that you tell the truth and 
answer in the affirmative. Later, pressed by his students, Kant further explained that if you 
answer truthfully, the would-be murderer would probably not believe you!  
 
FN36. W. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930). See W. ROSS, THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS 
(1939).  
 
FN37. See Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968); M. SHOAP, CASES AND 
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FN40. LAWYER’S CODE, supra note 23, Alternative B, Rule 1.2. 
 
FN41. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, rule l.6(b)(l): "A lawyer may reveal such information 
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary … to prevent the client from committing 
a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily 
harm ...."  
 
FN42. The Discussion Draft of the Model Rules had required that the disclosure be made in this 
situation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (Discussion Draft 1980).  
 
FN43. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. 
 
FN44. Of course this assumes that the clients are informed of the provisions of the Model 
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note 1, at 786-90.  
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FN49. The following is offered as proof of this contention. Let A represent the autonomy 
model, S represent the socialist model, D represent the deontological model, & represent the 
conjunction "and," "v" represent the alternative "or," and * represent "implies." We then have 
(A & D v S) & (S & D v A) & (A & S v D) * (A v D v S). This is true both in the "weak" 
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METHOD 194-97 (2d ed. 1979).  
 
FN50. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1981) [hereinafter cited 
as MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES, supra note, Rule 1.6; LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 23. Rule l.  
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from committing a crime or fraudulent act); LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 23, Alternative A, 
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to human life). In addition to these exceptions, the MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6(b)(2) 
allows a lawyer  to reveal information relating to the representation of a client  
 
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the 
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FN52. Fried, supra note 2, at 1075.  
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CAL. L. REV. 1079 (1976).  
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with the socialist model, provided that the state formally adopts a rule calling for the primacy of 
procedure over substance.  Under the deontological model as we have described it, an attorney 
should not be compelled to defend someone she believes is guilty; if the state's constitution 
requires that all accused persons be defended, that is a dilemma for the state, not for any 
individual attorney.  
 
FN61. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. 
 
FN62. MODEL CODE, supra note 50, DR 4-101(C)(3).  
 
FN63. See, e.g., Hodes, supra note 1, at 754-60.  
 
FN64. Using the autonomy model, the value of confidentiality will prevail over almost all 
competing concerns. Professor Freedman has stated that only in "rare and extreme" cases 
should the general rule of confidentiality be violated and disclosure made. Panel Discussion, 
supra note 1, at 646-47. An example of such a "rare and extreme" case is when a client informs 
his attorney of his intention to kill a named individual on a specified date in the future. 
Professor Freedman believes that in this case the attorney should violate the client's confidence 
and reveal his intent to kill the intended victim. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 2, 
at 6. This result is supported in a draft of the LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 23, Alternative A, 
Rule 1.4, which permits the lawyer to disclose the information to prevent "imminent danger to 
human life." In choosing to subordinate the general rule of confidentiality to such "rare and 
extreme" cases, the autonomy model appears to advocate a limited kind of inconsistency. In 
defending the Lawyer's Code Professor Freedman stated as follows:  
 
(W)hen you're writing rules in any important area, especially rules that are so full of conflicting values as 
those of lawyers' responsibilities, you have the problem of falling into either the trap of absolutism on the 
one hand or of risking inconsistency on the other. We have opted for a limited kind of  inconsistency. 
 Panel Discussion, supra note I, at 646.  
 
FN65. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. The deontological model would employ 
similar reasoning in treating harms of an economic nature, preferring nondisclosure to 
disclosure of a client's intent to commit such harms. This result is predicated upon the 
assumption that the contemplated economic activity does not transgress moral values. For 
example, while an antitrust or SEC violation may involve aggregation or collusion of economic 
power or noncompliance with statutory requirements, such violations do not constitute direct 
moral harms to third persons. On the other hand, cheating, lying, and misrepresentations are 
moral wrongs, not bare exercises of economic power. Indeed, the very legitimacy of economic 
actions may depend on the governing laws and policies of a given society. Further discussion of 
this area of economic harms may be pursued in a vast literature. See, e.g., Patterson, The Limits 
of the Lawyer's Discretion and the Law of Legal Ethics: National Student Marketing Revisited, 
1979 DUKE L.J. 1251 (analysis of SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp. and the new ethics 
for corporate securities lawyers that the case may signal). See also Hoffman, On Learning of a 
Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud—the Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 BUS. LAW.,1389 (1978); 
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Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New 
Trend in Standards of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 412 (1974).  
 
FN66.  People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 803 (N .Y. Cty. Ct. 1975). See also Hodes supra 
note 1, at 756.  
 
FN67. People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 799.  
 
FN68. Besides Freedman's discussion of the case in his book, M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' 
ETHICS, supra note 2, at 1-2, the case has also been debated in, e.g., Hodes, supra note 1, at 
756-58, and even used in the LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 23, as illustrative case 1(e). See also 
A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 127-30 (1976).  
 
FN69.  People v. Belge deserves further comment, since it also introduces the problem of 
attorney participation in a wrong or harm. In Belge, the attorneys did not actively participate in 
any harm; they simply remained silent and did not disclose the location of the buried bodies. In 
another case, however, the attorney did participate in a wrong by helping his client hide 
incriminating evidence. In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th 
Cir. 1967). While the deontological model supports the assertion of confidentiality over 
competing values in the absence of clear moral concerns, it does not follow that the principle of 
confidentiality may shield wrongful or criminal actions of the attorney asserting the privilege. 
The assertion of confidentiality may relate only to the fair defense of the client, and not to 
unfair, illegal, or fraudulent activities.  
 
FN70. The lawyer's ethical duty in defending a criminal client "may be qualified by 
constitutional provisions for due process and the right to counsel .... In some jurisdictions these 
provisions have been construed to require that counsel present an accused as a witness if the 
accused wishes to testify, even if counsel knows the testimony will be false." MODEL RULES, 
supra note 1, Rule 3.3 comment.  
 
FN71. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 2, at 27.  
 
FN72. Freedman, Three Hardest Questions, supra note 2, at 1477-78. While ultimately 
allowing the lawyer to implicitly participate in the perjury, Freedman, through private 
counseling efforts, would actively undertake to dissuade the client from committing perjury. 
Id.  at 1478.  
 
FN73. LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 23, illustrative cases l(a) and l(b).  
 
FN74. MODEL CODE, supra note 50, DR 7-102(B)(1).  
 
FN75. In 1974, the ABA amended the Model Code's unequivocal prohibition of perjured 
evidence by adding an exception to the general rule of rectification and disclosure for 
"information ... protected as a privileged communication." MODEL CODE, supra note 50, DR 7-
102(B)(1). The following year, Formal Opinion 341 confirmed the turnabout by interpreting the 
exception very broadly. Not surprisingly, therefore, "it is virtually impossible to imagine a case 
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in which DR 7-102(B)(1), as amended and as interpreted, would require disclosure."  Hodes, 
supra note I, at 778. However, only twelve states have adopted the 1974 amendment. Id. at 779.  
 
FN76. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3 and comment.  
 
FN77. See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 64-69 (1978).  
 
FN78. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fuller's systemic 
justice and integrity concerns. See also Lawry, Lying, Confidentiality, and the Adversary 
System of Justice, 1977 UTAH L. REV 653 (1977).  
 
FN79. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
 
FN80. See Note, Materiality of Question and Not of Answer Given in Testimony Constitutes 
Test for Perjury—United States v. Siegel (2d Cir. 1959), 73 HARV. L. REV. 599 (1960) 
(undisclosed author is A. D'Amato).  
 
FN81. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
 
FN82. We exclude intent to commit murder because all models agree that in that case there 
should be disclosure, though, as we have previously indicated, the autonomy model seems to 
concede this point at the expense of consistency with its  own precepts. See supra note 64. 
 
FN83. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 643.  
 
FN84. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3 comment:  
[U)nless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false 
evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the 
lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the 
court.  
 
FN85. See LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 23, Alternative A, Rules 1.1 to 1.6 and Alternative B, 
Rules 1.1 to 1.4. The only apparent exception to confidentiality for physical harms in these 
rules is the "necessary to prevent imminent danger to human life" provision of Alternative A, 
Rule 1.4.  
 
FN86. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Revised Final Draft 1982); 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.6(b)(2) (Proposed Final Draft 1981). 
 
FN87. MODEL RULES, supra note I, Rule 1.6(b)(1). 
 
FN88. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
 
FN89. MODEL CODE, supra note 50 DR 4-101(C)(2).  
 




FN91. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 comment.  
 
FN92. To be sure, Freedman wants the lawyer first to put up a fight; the Lawyer's Code allows 
disclosure "only after good faith efforts to test the validity of the law, rule, or order have been 
exhausted." LAWYER'S CODE supra note 23, Alternatives A and B, Rule 1.3. But this only 
addresses the question when not whether the lawyer should disclose the confidence. That 
distinction is important if we are asking whether a lawyer should volunteer information (e.g., on 
the whereabouts of a fugitive); but it is not important in this article since we are examining the 
"law" exception to confidentiality on its own terms.  
 
FN93. Hodes, supra note 1, at 760.  
 
FN94. Id. at 760 n.71 (emphasis in original).  
 
FN95. MODEL CODE, supra note 50, DR 4-101(C)(4).  
 
FN96. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).  
 
FN97. Hodes, supra note 1, at 760-65.  
 
FN98. For an extended discussion of the immorality of pre-Civil War fugitive slave laws, see 
R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 8-22, 257-59 (1975); D'Amato, Lon Fuller and Substantive 
Natural Law, 26 AM.1. JURIS. 202, 214-16 (1981).  
 
FN99 . See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. In the slavery case, of course, the slave 
owner faces the threat of financial harm if the slave is not returned; but this harm is trumped by 
the far more important right of a human being not to be enslaved.  
 
FN100. Fried, supra note 2, at 1085.  
 
FN101. R. COVER, supra note 98, at 8-22, 257-59; compare D'Amato, supra note 98, at  
215-16.  
 
FN102. Fried, supra note 2, at 1085.  
 
FN103. An escaped convict should not be able to force a doctor to dress his gunshot wound but 
not report him, or a bartender not to notify the police because he pays for his drink, or a lawyer 
not to turn him in because he pays the attorney's fees. These examples indicate that a person 
who is not entitled to demand confidentiality from anyone else should not be able to purchase a 
lawyer's "confidentiality."  
 
FN104. See D'Amato, The Speluncean Explorers—Further Proceedings, 32 STAN. L. REV. 467, 
475-80 (1980).  
 
FN105. This is an apparent consequence of Hart's concept of "justice" in society. See H. HART, 




FN106. See, e.g,  J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 112 (1980); D,  
LYONS, THE FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
22-23 (1971).  
 
FN107. See R. BRANDT, supra note 39, at 369-75; W. FRANKENA supra note 34,  
at 17-23; A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 82-89 (1978).  
 
